

Central Intelligence Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20505

DCI/DDCI Executive Staff

5 November 1986

NOTE TO DDCI

Attached are the two things you asked for earlier this week for your upcoming speeches -- the numbers on Soviet aid to Nicaragua, Angola, etc., and the evidence on Syrian, Libyan, and Iranian state support for counterterrorism.

On the former, the authors tell me that you could easily use the grand total numbers on the two tables on an unclassified basis. I have asked them to try to get you some better numbers on the Turkish information. (

On the latter, I think you will find more than enough to indict. The CTC has mixed unclassified with classified material, but you will find that most of the sentences are carefully marked. I suspect that much of what they have classified is judgmental rather than derived from specific reports.

Paul

*They've looked - don't have anything more specific.*

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MEMORANDUM FOR:

[redacted]  
Executive Assistant to DDCI

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FROM:

[redacted] Deputy Chief  
International Security Issues Division, OGI

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SUBJECT:

Communist Aid to the Third World [redacted]

Warsaw Pact Support for Nicaragua and Angola

The Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies have provided substantial and growing military support to Nicaragua since 1982. Major equipment items delivered to Nicaragua include MI-8 and MI-17 transport helicopters, MI-25 helicopter gunships, large quantities of jeeps, trucks, and other logistical support and transport equipment. Communist countries have also become Nicaragua's major source of economic aid in the 1980s as Moscow and its allies have tried to shore up a Nicaraguan economy deteriorating rapidly because of cutbacks in Western funding, slumping industrial and agricultural production, and falling export earnings. Since 1982, Communist countries have provided an average of \$300 million in economic aid annually, bolstered by Soviet supplies of oil and products in 1984-86 valued at \$300 million. Most of this aid must ultimately be repaid. Moscow also has provided large numbers of trucks, agricultural vehicles, and road building equipment, aid to hospitals, irrigation and power development, gold mining and minerals prospecting, and school construction. Cuba and East Germany have been heavy contributors, each providing \$200 to \$250 million in aid since 1982; Havana has constructed a sugar plant, rail line, roads, airfields, and oil storage facilities. Communist countries are expected to provide three-quarters of all the aid flowing to Nicaragua in 1986.

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SUBJECT: Communist Aid to the Third World 

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Angola has become Moscow's leading arms client in sub-Saharan Africa through deliveries of MiG-23 and SU-22 fighters, MI-17 and MI-24 helicopters, and a wide range of air defense systems, such as the SA-13, SA-2, SA-8, and SA-7. Communist economic ~~aid for~~ Angola has focused on the provision of technicians (7100 in 1985) to help stem the critical deterioration in Angola's economy. Luanda pays for these technicians in hard currency, adding further to the country's economic woes. Communist aid to date has not been able to keep economic production at levels seen before the current government took power. Aid disbursements have averaged only about \$20 million annually, all of it in the form of loans. We expect agricultural, and fisheries development projects under a \$2 billion agreement signed in 1982.

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SUBJECT: Communist Aid to the Third World

Communist Arms in Grenada

Maurice Bishop and the other New Jewel Movement (NJM) leaders sought to bring Grenada into the Soviet orbit. Bishop signed formal cooperation treaties with Moscow and other close Soviet allies such as Cuba, Czechoslovakia, Vietnam, and North Korea. Other secret agreements were also signed with these countries providing counter-intelligence and surveillance equipment, and military, political, and intelligence training. Major military equipment items uncovered on the island following the US intervention included at least 4 Soviet BTR-60 and 2 BRDM armored vehicles, Soviet and Czech light anti-aircraft guns, thousands of Soviet AK-47 and AKM assault rifles, large quantities of Czech IFA and Soviet ZIL trucks, and several Soviet ZIS anti-tank guns. Contract information revealed that equipment on order would be sufficient to arm a fighting force of over 10,000 men. Grenada was awaiting delivery of the following Soviet Bloc military equipment:

- About 10,000 assault and other rifles.
- More than 11.5 million rounds of 7.62 ammunition.
- Some 300 portable rocket launchers with over 16,000 rockets.
- Sixty armored personnel carriers and patrol vehicles.
- A transport aircraft capable of carrying 39 special forces paratroopers.

Warsaw Pact Weapons for Turkish Terrorists

A large number of Warsaw Pact origin small arms and other weapons found their way via the gray arms market to Turkish terrorist groups during the 1970s. Smaller amounts of such equipment continues to turn up. Turkish security forces have uncovered military equipment originating in:

- Czechoslovakia. The CZ-75 pistol was popular with Turkish terrorists in the late 1970s because it chambered the same ammunition used in many of their submachineguns. Turkish officials found several thousand CZ-75s entering the country illegally during 1979. An arms cache uncovered in Turkey in 1979 contained Czech VZ-58 assault rifles.
- Poland. Armenian terrorists used Polish WZ-63 submachineguns in attacks against a Turkish diplomat in Lisbon in 1983 and in 1982 during a siege of the Esenboga airport in Turkey. The WZ-63 is ideal for terrorist use

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because of its light weight--less than 2 kilograms--and small size, measuring less than 33 centimeters with the stock folded.

-- Hungary. The Hungarian 9mm Walthum pistol was frequently used by Armenian terrorists in the late 1970s.

-- Soviet Union. In 1981 Turkish officials uncovered Soviet MAD bazookas, Soviet-origin AK-47 rifles, and F-1 hand grenades in Armenian arms caches.

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State Support for International Terrorism: Syria, Libya and Iran

State support constitutes a significant and lethal component of international terrorism and has become an established instrument of foreign policy of some Middle Eastern countries, especially Libya, Syria and Iran. Evidence of Libyan, Syrian and Iranian complicity in acts of international terrorism is clear and convincing, dating back in some cases to the early seventies.

Libya, Syria and Iran support terrorism in several ways. All three provide financial, logistical, propaganda, training, and communications support as well as weapons to their terrorist surrogates. In some cases state agents actually have planned, directed, and carried out terrorist operations. These three states, however, largely use other groups as their surrogates to conduct terrorism that the states can later deny having sponsored or encouraged.

Libya

Tripoli is one of the more visible state supporters of terrorism. In keeping with its revolutionary philosophy Libya has provided aid to numerous national liberation movements and almost every international terrorist group. Qadhafi's largesse has extended to groups in Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa and the Middle East. Libya uses its Libyan People's Bureaus (LPBs) not just to maintain formal diplomatic relations but as a focal point for Libyan

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25X1 intelligence and terrorist activities. Qadhafi's terrorist ire, however, is largely reserved for Libyan dissidents living abroad, moderate Arab states, and the United States.

25X1 Evidence of Libyan involvement in terrorism over the last two years is sweeping and conclusive. Libyan assassins have been arrested at the scene of the attacks; captured agents in foiled plots have confessed to links with Libya; equipment used in terrorist operations has been traced to Libya; and Libyan have been duped by sting operations into making incriminating statements recorded on video and audio tapes.

25X1 -- An attack in April 1985 on a Libyan exile in Bonn--which resulted in his murder and the wounding of two German bystanders--ended in the arrest and subsequent conviction of the Libyan assassin.

25X1 -- A Libyan Arab Airlines employee was arrested after he shot a Libyan-born businessmen in Greece in June 1984.

25X1 -- The Libyan assailant of a Moroccan citizen in April 1985 in West Germany was captured at the scene of the attack.

25X1 -- In February 1985, Chad presented evidence to the UN Security Council of a September 1984 plot to assassinate President Habre. A Libyan-made attache case bomb was to be placed in the meeting room of the Council of Ministers and detonated from a remote location.

25X1 The detonating device was traced to stock purchased by Libya.

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25X1 -- Tunisian authorities in September 1985 announced the expulsion of a Libyan diplomat who had smuggled letter bombs through the diplomatic pouch.

25X1 -- According to Egyptian press, Libyans claiming diplomatic immunity --but lacking proper accreditation--were discovered in August 1984 trying to smuggle boxloads of weapons into an unidentified Arab country.

25X1 -- British police found weapons, ammunition, and body armor in the Libyan People's Bureau after the UK severed relations with Libya in April 1984. The diplomatic break was prompted by the killing of a British police officer by a shot fired from inside the LPB.

25X1 -- In November 1984, the Egyptians encouraged Qadhafi to believe that his hired agents had assassinated former Libyan Prime Minister Bakoush. The Libyan press claimed credit for the killing of Bakoush, after which Egypt revealed that the four assassins were in custody and pictures of the alleged victim were fakes.

25X1 -- Egypt successfully infiltrated another plot against high-level Libyan exiles in November 1985. Libyan nationals were among those arrested. After the attack was aborted and arrests were made, audio and video tapes incriminating Libya were played in Egyptian media.

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Libyan Involvement in Hijacking of Egyptair Flight 648 and the Attacks on the El Al Airport Ticket Counters.

Evidence of Libyan involvement in the November 1985 hijacking of Egyptair Flight 648 and the December attacks on the El Al counters at the Vienna and Rome airports is largely circumstantial. It is not clear whether Libya participated in the planning or execution of the hijacking, but it certainly moved quickly to exploit the situation. Evidence of Libyan complicity in the airport attacks is more concrete, and we judge it likely that Libya played at least a logistical support role. [redacted]

Egyptair

While there is no "smoking gun" with which to convict Libya for the hijacking, there is evidence of Libyan involvement:

-- [redacted] the hijackers wanted to be flown to Tunisia or Tripoli, Libya [redacted]

-- The Libyan ambassador in Malta spoke with the hijackers at their request. [redacted]

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### El Al Attacks

There is better evidence tying Libya to the Rome and Vienna attacks on 27 December. ✓

-- Tunisian officials reported that Libya provided the three passports used by the terrorists in Vienna. Two had been seized from Tunisians expelled from Libya last fall, and the third had been lost by a Tunisian resident in Libya [redacted]

-- While the Libyan press quickly provided supporting rhetoric, calling the attacks "heroic operations", Qadhafi dissassociated himself from these comments after an international uproar. [redacted]

### Recent Libyan Activity

[redacted] one of the suspects arrested by Pakistani authorities in connection with the attempted hijacking of Pan Am Flight 73 has ties to Libya and that Libya probably provided logistical support to the hijackers. [redacted]

Libya also has been implicated in a number of other extremely vicious anti-Western attacks. [redacted]

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On 5 April, Tripoli undeniably sponsored an attack--probably conducted by Palestinians--against the La Belle discotheque in West Berlin, killing three people including one American.



In response to the retaliatory airstrikes launched by the United States on Tripoli and Benghazi on 14 April, Libya initiated a new round of terrorist violence.

-- On 15 April a US Embassy communicator was shot and severely wounded in Khartoum, Sudan.  Circumstantial evidence points strongly to Libyan involvement.

-- The British Government has publicly blamed Libya for the death of two British teachers kidnaped in West Beirut in late March. Their bodies, along with that of American Peter Kilburn--a hostage since December 1984 who may have been held by an independent group

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in Lebanon and "sold" to the Libyans--were found together on 17

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April. Libya, therefore probably had a hand in Kilburn's death as

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well. The note accompanying the bodies said that they had been


executed in retaliation for the US raid on Libya. 

-- On 18 April, two Libyans were apprehended as they approached the  
US Officers Club in Ankara to launch an attack with six


Soviet-made fragmentation grenades they claimed they had received  
from the Libyan People's Bureau in Ankara. Two other Libyans were

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arrested soon afterward as possible accomplices. 


-- On 25 April, unknown <sup>✓</sup>gumen seriously wounded another US Embassy  
employee in Sanaa, Yemen Arab Republic. The assailants are  
believed to have been Libyan-sponsored 

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A growing body of circumstantial evidence also points to Libyan  
sponsorship of the 3 August attack on the British base in Akotiri, Cyprus, in  
which two persons were wounded. 

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
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Syria

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Syria long has used terrorist tactics to dissuade opponents and recalcitrant allies from pursuing policies inimical to Syrian interests. Support for terrorist groups costs Syria little but raises the cost to participants of any peace initiative that excludes Damascus and serves to keep Assad's regional rivals off balance. 

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Syria largely uses surrogates to mask its role in terrorist attacks and to obtain leverage over the groups Damascus supports. Syria enables terrorist groups to use Syrian or Syrian-controlled territory for base camps, training facilities, and political headquarters and provides arms, travel assistance, intelligence, and probably money. Some of the groups linked to Syria are the Abu Nidal Group, the PFLP-GC, and Abu Musa's Fatah rebels. 

The recently concluded Hindawi trial in London, however, paints the most damaging picture of direct Syrian involvement in terrorism since the early 1980s. The British investigation implicated top Syrian Air Force Intelligence

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officials, the Syrian Arab Airlines, and Syrian Embassy personnel, including the Ambassador, in the plot to blow up an El Al jet last April carrying 340 passengers, 220 of whom were US citizens. Although we have no information on the involvement of President Assad in the El Al plot, we believe that the head of Air Force Intelligence, Muhammad al-Khuli, probably cleared it with him. Assad, a former Air Force General himself, relies heavily on Air Force Intelligence to implement terrorist policy, and al-Khuli is considered his chief troubleshooter and personal emissary.

-- Nizar Hindawi, a Palestinian living in London, traveled to Syria in January 1986 seeking funding for a new terrorist group in Western Europe, the Jordanian Revolutionary Movement. He met with several Syrian Air Force Intelligence officials, including al-Khuli.

-- In February, Haitham Said, second in command of Syrian Air Force Intelligence, told Hindawi about the plan to place a bomb on an El Al flight leaving London. He also gave Hindawi an official Syrian passport with a false identity.

-- Back in Damascus, Said instructed Hindawi on how to use the bomb and specified the flight on which it was to be placed. He allegedly promised to pay Hindawi \$250,000 one week after the successful completion of the operation.

-- On 5 April, Hindawi traveled to London and picked up the explosive

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25X1 device.

-- After he learned that El Al security had discovered the bomb in his girlfriend's suitcase, Hindawi went to the Syrian Embassy. The Ambassador told an embassy employee to accompany Hindawi to a Syrian safehouse in West Kensington. Hindawi escaped the next morning en route to the Syrian Embassy.

25X1 Hindawi's links to Syrian intelligence were at least partially confirmed by the interrogations of his brother in West Berlin and his cousin in Genoa.

25X1 -- Ahmed Hasi, the suspect in the bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Union building last March, confirmed that Hindawi traveled to Syria where he contacted intelligence officials in January. Hasi also claims that Hindawi made arrangements for him to pick up from the Syrian Embassy in East Berlin the explosive device that subsequently was used in the bombing of the Friendship Union building.

25X1 -- The arrest of Hindawi's cousin, Awni Hindawi, in Genoa revealed that he too belonged to the Jordanian Revolutionary Movement. In his apartment, police discovered a letter from Nizar in London requesting that Awni contact Haitham Said in Damascus to help secure his release from prison.

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25X1 Finally, evidence gathered in preparation for the upcoming trial of Ahmed Hasi for his part in the bombing of the German-Arab Friendship Building early last year almost certainly will tie Syria to the operation.

Syrian supported groups also were involved in the following terrorist incidents:

25X1 -- On 26 June, a bomb exploded in the hands of an El Al worker at Madrid airport, and the terrorist arrested said he was a member of the Abu Musa Group, an anti-Arafat Palestinian group headquartered in Damascus.

25X1 -- The Abu Nidal Group was responsible for the vicious Egyptair hijacking in November 1985 and also attacked the Rome and Vienna El Al ticket counters on 27 December. The three attacks accounted for nearly 200 casualties (killed and wounded) including more than 20 Americans.

25X1 -- A grenade attack on a Rome sidewalk cafe in September injured 38 tourists, including nine Americans. The Revolutionary Organization of Socialist Moslems (ROSM)--another Abu Nidal covername--claimed responsibility for the attack.

-- Nine days after the attack on the cafe, police arrested a Palestinian in connection with an explosion at the British Airways office in Rome that injured 15 people. The suspect claimed to be a member of ROSM and was later identified by witnesses as the same

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man who attacked the Jordanian Airways office in Athens in March. [REDACTED]

-- In April rockets were fired at a Jordanian airliner leaving Athens airport, and, one day earlier, a rocket narrowly missed the Jordanian Embassy building in Rome. Black September claimed responsibility for both incidents. [REDACTED]

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IRAN

Iranian leaders are committed to the longterm goal of exporting the revolution and many advocate the use of terrorism and political violence to achieve that goal. [REDACTED] The level of terrorism by Iranian-supported groups has declined over the past two years, however, and Tehran has not been directly linked with any major terrorist incidents this year. Nevertheless Iraq, France, and the United States remain Iran's primary targets. [REDACTED]

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Most of Iran's attention is focused on its war with Iraq, and Tehran continues to recruit, train, and finance Iraqi Shia dissidents who are dedicated to the overthrow of Saddam Husayn. [REDACTED]

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
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Lebanon has been the scene of most of the terrorism perpetrated by groups that Iran supports. Tehran has ties to the radical Shia factions that have kidnaped foreigners and are conducting terrorist operations against Western--and particularly US and French--interests. The extent of Tehran's influence over these groups, however, is unclear. There is no indication that Iran ordered or assisted in the kidnappings or the attacks against the French in Lebanon, although groups claiming responsibility for the operations alleged they were done for Iran's benefit. 

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-- Iranian-backed groups in Lebanon may have been responsible for the

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abduction of two Americans and several French citizens this year. Factions seeking to press Paris to improve relations with Tehran claimed responsibility for the kidnaping of a French television crew last spring, and two were released this summer when the states were negotiating bilateral issues. Iran probably did not instigate the operation. A little known group called the Revolutionary Justice Organization claimed it had abducted Frank Reed and Joseph Cicippio in early September. We believe Libyan-backed elements may have carried out the operations, possibly with support from Hizballah supporters.

-- A faction of Hizballah continues to hold two US hostages--Terry Anderson and Thomas Sutherland.

-- Iranian-backed factions in Lebanon may also have been responsible for the murder of a French military attache in Beirut in September and for the attacks against the French contingent of The UNIFIL in South Lebanon. Iran opposes the presence of the UN force in the south and probably was not directly involved in the guerrilla-style attacks against the UNIFIL units, but IRGC elements based in Sidon could have participated in the attacks in the south.

Iran is trying to improve bilateral ties to Western Europe and the Gulf states, gain international respectability, and expand commercial relations

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25X1 [ ] worldwide. As long as these goals are given priority, Tehran is likely to be  
25X1 cautious in providing support for terrorist operations, particularly where its  
involvement might be revealed. [ ]

-- We believe, however, that Tehran will revert to active support of  
25X1 terrorism if it suffers a serious setback in the war or perceives  
that the Gulf states are increasing their support to Iraq. [ ]

-- Iran will continue to recruit Shia dissidents from Saudi Arabia,  
25X1 Kuwait, Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates, and Iraq, give them  
military training in Iran, and try to send them back to the Gulf. [ ]  
They probably will be cautioned, however, not to plan spectacular  
25X1 acts of violence now, but to concentrate on building local  
networks [ ]

-- We also believe that Iran will expand its networks in Europe,  
25X1 Africa, and Asia, using local Shia communities, religious and  
cultural institutions, as well as its diplomatic service to  
25X1 bolster its capability to conduct or support terrorist activities. [ ]

[ ]

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